The Terrorism Index: A Survey of the U.S. National Security Experts on the War on Terror

Originally published on June 28th, 2006 for the Center for American Progress

A new survey of U.S. foreign policy experts presents a surprising consensus that questions current policies and assumptions in the war on terror. The survey, conducted jointly by the Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy magazine, was presented today at a panel discussion.

Featured on the panel were survey participants Dr. Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, and Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Colin Powell and professor at the College of William & Mary. David Bosco, senior editor of Foreign Policy magazine, joined them along with moderator Joseph Cirincione.

The survey polled 116 foreign policy experts in the first installment of what is intended as a twice-yearly Terrorism Index. Survey participants came from a range of professional and ideological backgrounds, and the results were balanced to give equal weight to those who self-identified as conservative, liberal, and moderate.

The results of the survey provide surprising insights into how experts are viewing the war on terror’s progress. Most experts believe the U.S. is losing the war on terror and that the American people are becoming less safe. Establishing democratic governments in the Muslim world is not widely regarded as a key element in winning the war on terror, and there is a general dissatisfaction with the current effectiveness of government agencies in fighting terrorism.

Questions about current U.S. national security priorities indicate that the experts believe changes are needed. Securing weapons of mass destruction is regarded as more important than fighting terrorism generally. The majority favored increasing funds to the State Department, USAID, and other soft power agencies, while decreasing funding for the military. Most experts also believe that strengthening multilateral institutions should be a higher priority. According to Bosco, the survey tells the U.S. that the “remaining challenges are outside of the military realm.”

Drawing from the survey, the panel offered a variety of conclusions that lead to a spirited debate on national security. Wilkerson noted the “incredible discrepancy in resources” between the Department of Defense and Department of State, and said “that imbalance has perhaps caused some of the problems we are facing.” He emphasized that military force cannot be the first option for all foreign policy problems. “Bombs, bullets, and bayonets,” he said, “are not the answer to terrorism.”

Scheuer, while saying that, “We vastly underestimate the amount of killing left to do,” agreed with the idea that changes are needed in how the U.S. thinks about national security. Both experts said that the war in Iraq has made American security more difficult. “We’re the primary target,” Scheuer said, “because we’re in the way of what the enemy wants to do.” He advocated energy independence as key element in getting out of the way.

Scheuer did emphasize that “America has its future in its own hands,” but said that the security system right now is unsustainable and that changes need to be made. On that point, he seems to agree with the other national security experts surveyed. Wilkerson was certainly among that group. On our current course, he said, we are going to either “commit suicide as a democracy or spend ourselves to death.”

Countering Pandemic Disease and Biological Terrorism

Originally published June 22, 2006 for the Center for American Progress

The United States must develop more systematic and comprehensive solutions to the biological security threats facing our nation. This refrain, heard from panelists at a Center for American Progress event today, built from a report on biosecurity released at the discussion.

Panelists included the co-authors of the report, Andrew Grotto, senior national security analyst at the Center, and Jonathan Tucker from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Joining them were Laura Segal, public affairs director at the Trust for America’s Health, and David Heyman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The threats of bioterrorism and epidemic disease share many common characteristics, and according to the panel, the United States needs to appreciate those commonalities in order to create a more efficient and effective crisis response plan. “Our ability to address biothreats must be comprehensive in nature,” Heyman said, and not dependent on “stovepipe” solutions that are localized, separate, and fragmented.

Current federal plans assume state and local capabilities that do not exist, according to Segal. “If a pandemic hit,” she said, “it would bankrupt the U.S. medical system.” The panel used the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as an example of how our current public health system is inadequately prepared for sudden shocks. With improved communication and cooperation across all levels, the situation would improve, but currently “there is no standard across systems” according to Heyman.

For biothreats, “the best defense,” Grotto said, “is a good public health system.” In the event of a crisis, hospitals and local health departments are the first line of defense. Right now a complicated system of diverse public and private institutions creates significant interoperability problems. The U.S. must develop synchronized federal, state, and local systems to create a truly comprehensive approach for diminishing biothreats.

The need for a comprehensive plan is important on an international level as well, because, as Heyman points out, “Bugs don’t know political boundaries.” Effectively implementing international health standards, especially in developing countries, is important to U.S. biosecurity. Effective international nonproliferation programs for biological weapons are also key. According to Tucker, research on dangerous pathogens is too open and widespread, and an international consensus on pathogen security is needed. Risks also exist from rogue scientists of former state-sponsored bioweapons programs.

Current policies are inadequate, relying on “a hope and pray attitude,” according to Segal. There is an over-reliance on a “one bug, one drug” approach that holds specific pharmaceuticals as a primary defense against biothreats. A “broad spectrum” comprehensive approach “could be more cost-effective,” especially because an improved public health system would better handle common diseases. Whether an epidemic disease or a terrorist attack, the possibility of a major health crisis means, said Heyman, “We have to take care of ourselves together.”