The Terrorism Index: A Survey of the U.S. National Security Experts on the War on Terror

Originally published on June 28th, 2006 for the Center for American Progress

A new survey of U.S. foreign policy experts presents a surprising consensus that questions current policies and assumptions in the war on terror. The survey, conducted jointly by the Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy magazine, was presented today at a panel discussion.

Featured on the panel were survey participants Dr. Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, and Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Colin Powell and professor at the College of William & Mary. David Bosco, senior editor of Foreign Policy magazine, joined them along with moderator Joseph Cirincione.

The survey polled 116 foreign policy experts in the first installment of what is intended as a twice-yearly Terrorism Index. Survey participants came from a range of professional and ideological backgrounds, and the results were balanced to give equal weight to those who self-identified as conservative, liberal, and moderate.

The results of the survey provide surprising insights into how experts are viewing the war on terror’s progress. Most experts believe the U.S. is losing the war on terror and that the American people are becoming less safe. Establishing democratic governments in the Muslim world is not widely regarded as a key element in winning the war on terror, and there is a general dissatisfaction with the current effectiveness of government agencies in fighting terrorism.

Questions about current U.S. national security priorities indicate that the experts believe changes are needed. Securing weapons of mass destruction is regarded as more important than fighting terrorism generally. The majority favored increasing funds to the State Department, USAID, and other soft power agencies, while decreasing funding for the military. Most experts also believe that strengthening multilateral institutions should be a higher priority. According to Bosco, the survey tells the U.S. that the “remaining challenges are outside of the military realm.”

Drawing from the survey, the panel offered a variety of conclusions that lead to a spirited debate on national security. Wilkerson noted the “incredible discrepancy in resources” between the Department of Defense and Department of State, and said “that imbalance has perhaps caused some of the problems we are facing.” He emphasized that military force cannot be the first option for all foreign policy problems. “Bombs, bullets, and bayonets,” he said, “are not the answer to terrorism.”

Scheuer, while saying that, “We vastly underestimate the amount of killing left to do,” agreed with the idea that changes are needed in how the U.S. thinks about national security. Both experts said that the war in Iraq has made American security more difficult. “We’re the primary target,” Scheuer said, “because we’re in the way of what the enemy wants to do.” He advocated energy independence as key element in getting out of the way.

Scheuer did emphasize that “America has its future in its own hands,” but said that the security system right now is unsustainable and that changes need to be made. On that point, he seems to agree with the other national security experts surveyed. Wilkerson was certainly among that group. On our current course, he said, we are going to either “commit suicide as a democracy or spend ourselves to death.”

What Now in Iraq?

Originally published July 21, 2006 for the Center for American Progress

The rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq will not be easily improved, but to do so we must have a different plan from what currently exists. This message was delivered by a panel discussion of distinguished foreign policy experts held at the Center for American Progress.

Leslie Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Lawrence Korb, Senior Fellow of the Center for American Progress, participated in the panel. Morton Halperin, also a Senior Fellow of the Center for American Progress, moderated. The panel was introduced by Center for American Progress President and CEO John Podesta.

In his introduction, Podesta highlighted the current security and reconstruction difficulties in Iraq, drawing particular attention to the recent upsurge in violence. Criticizing the “failure to plan a post-invasion success strategy,” he said that “mistakes in Iraq have served to strengthen our adversaries and make us less safe.” Those sentiments were supported by Halperin, who said “we’re hearing less about success and more about avoiding catastrophe.”

The question of what to do next was picked up by the panelists. Gelb found the administration’s current plan unacceptable. “It’s a policy that can’t win,” he said. “It can only lose slowly.” He cited the decision to end economic reconstruction funding at the end of this year, restrictions on democracy-building nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the decreased street presence of U.S. troops as evidence of a strategy by President Bush to not “lose on his watch.”

This assessment was echoed by Korb, who drew attention to Iraq’s negative impact on broader national security goals. “We’re not at war with terrorism,” he said. “Terrorism is a tactic= We’re at war with radical jihadists, and if you stay in Iraq you’re going to make it harder to win the war against radical jihadism.” Using Iran and Afghanistan as prime examples, Korb argued that we cannot afford to have so many military resources invested in Iraq. The U.S. presence in Iraq is actually counterproductive, he said, because we are providing ready recruiting incentives for Al Qaeda. Furthermore, the quality of people in the army is declining; manpower is stressed because there is “tremendous pressure on recruiters to meet their quotas in an unpopular war.”

Korb advocated strategic redeployment, which entails a set date for withdrawal and a redistribution of our military in the Middle East to better protect America. He said that a timetable will “give the Iraqis an incentive to do what they need to do” in making political arrangements and securing the country. A commitment to leave would also, according to Korb, “diffuse part of the insurgency” since “a lot of people are fighting our troops there because they don’t believe that we’re going to go.”

Gelb favored a U.S. role in crafting a better political solution before withdrawing troops. In building Iraqi anti-insurgent capability, he said, “the answer is not more arms and better training. The answer is a government that troops will fight and die for. The key is a political settlement.” It is his hope that by being a strong and active leader, the United States can help broker a decentralized power-sharing arrangement to accommodate Iraq’s diverse factions. Iraq, Gelb said, will “end up partitioned and decentralized either by war or by negotiations. We owe it to ourselves — we owe it to Iraqis — to figure out a compromise.”

The key to both positions were the questions of how effective an incentive a definitive date for U.S. withdrawal would be, and how active a role the United States should take in shaping the Iraqi government. Both panelists agreed that a new approach is badly needed if we are to have any chance of success. “Almost anything you do in Iraq,” Gelb said, “is going to be a long shot.” But no matter what the prospects, Korb emphasized that we must make hard decisions based on “what’s best for the United States and our security.”

No Mere Oversight

Originally published July 13, 2006 for the Center for American Progress

The Center for American Progress today releases a comprehensive study of congressional oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community, "No Mere Oversight: Congressional Oversight of Intelligence is Broken," that delineates where Congress is failing in its oversight duties and how past congressional methods, ways and means of effective oversight could be revived to correct the problems. In the study, authors Denis McDonough, Mara Rudman and Peter Rundlet explore the history of congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community and then examine how past congressional experience could be drawn upon today by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to ensure effective intelligence gathering capabilities are the norm, not the exception.

After the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and after more than three years (and counting) of lost American lives and treasure in Iraq partly because of faulty and misused intelligence, there’s no longer any doubt about the crucial importance to U.S. national security of obtaining robust, accurate, and objective intelligence. Every person in America has a stake in ensuring that our policymakers take actions based on the best available intelligence.

The collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence is a very complicated process, made more difficult because it is necessarily conducted under a shroud of utmost secrecy. It is the job of the 17 executive branch agencies that make up the so called Intelligence Community to perform these functions, but Congress has an essential role to play with respect to ensuring that these agencies have the resources and guidance they need to do their job well and within the limitations of the laws and Constitution of the United States.

As Americans are learning every day, effective congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence agencies run by the executive branch is critical to protecting our national security as well as the values of freedom and openness on which our country was founded. Recent news headlines that the National Security Agency is collecting the phone records of tens of millions of Americans without the knowledge of key congressional committees underscores the need for Congress to serve as the American public’s watchdog in overseeing intelligence agencies.

Congress must ensure the U.S. Intelligence Community has the resources it needs to identify terrorist threats at home and abroad while also ensuring that intelligence operations are conducted consistent with the law and the Constitution. Alas, Congress today has been negligent on both scores — with profound implications for the safety and security of America. The consequences of faulty pre-Iraq war intelligence are mounting daily in the Middle East and around the world just as the United States must unite the world behind efforts to stop Iran from charging headlong into production of nuclear weapons material.

Countering Pandemic Disease and Biological Terrorism

Originally published June 22, 2006 for the Center for American Progress

The United States must develop more systematic and comprehensive solutions to the biological security threats facing our nation. This refrain, heard from panelists at a Center for American Progress event today, built from a report on biosecurity released at the discussion.

Panelists included the co-authors of the report, Andrew Grotto, senior national security analyst at the Center, and Jonathan Tucker from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Joining them were Laura Segal, public affairs director at the Trust for America’s Health, and David Heyman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The threats of bioterrorism and epidemic disease share many common characteristics, and according to the panel, the United States needs to appreciate those commonalities in order to create a more efficient and effective crisis response plan. “Our ability to address biothreats must be comprehensive in nature,” Heyman said, and not dependent on “stovepipe” solutions that are localized, separate, and fragmented.

Current federal plans assume state and local capabilities that do not exist, according to Segal. “If a pandemic hit,” she said, “it would bankrupt the U.S. medical system.” The panel used the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as an example of how our current public health system is inadequately prepared for sudden shocks. With improved communication and cooperation across all levels, the situation would improve, but currently “there is no standard across systems” according to Heyman.

For biothreats, “the best defense,” Grotto said, “is a good public health system.” In the event of a crisis, hospitals and local health departments are the first line of defense. Right now a complicated system of diverse public and private institutions creates significant interoperability problems. The U.S. must develop synchronized federal, state, and local systems to create a truly comprehensive approach for diminishing biothreats.

The need for a comprehensive plan is important on an international level as well, because, as Heyman points out, “Bugs don’t know political boundaries.” Effectively implementing international health standards, especially in developing countries, is important to U.S. biosecurity. Effective international nonproliferation programs for biological weapons are also key. According to Tucker, research on dangerous pathogens is too open and widespread, and an international consensus on pathogen security is needed. Risks also exist from rogue scientists of former state-sponsored bioweapons programs.

Current policies are inadequate, relying on “a hope and pray attitude,” according to Segal. There is an over-reliance on a “one bug, one drug” approach that holds specific pharmaceuticals as a primary defense against biothreats. A “broad spectrum” comprehensive approach “could be more cost-effective,” especially because an improved public health system would better handle common diseases. Whether an epidemic disease or a terrorist attack, the possibility of a major health crisis means, said Heyman, “We have to take care of ourselves together.”